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1071 
EMPLOYEE, VOLUNTEER, OR NEITHER?  
PROPOSING A TAX-BASED EXCEPTION TO FLSA 
WAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR NONPROFIT INTERNS 




Abstract: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) mandates compliance with various 
requirements, including minimum wages, for individuals classified as “employees.” But 
courts have grappled with the definition of “employee” for decades. They have struggled to 
determine whether individuals who are not classified as employees by their employer and are 
instead labeled “trainees,” “interns,” “externs,” or otherwise must be paid fair wages under 
the FLSA. This question became more pronounced amid the rise of unpaid internships for 
students and recent graduates in the post-2008 recession years. In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight, 
the Second Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to specifically address the unpaid 
intern issue in the context of for-profit employers, holding that interns were employees if the 
employer received the “primary benefit” from the relationship. The case did not touch on 
unpaid nonprofit internships, which some scholars believe are—and should be—exempt from 
employee tests under a broad nonprofit exception. However, recent scholarship exploring the 
Second Circuit’s logic in Fox Searchlight indicates that unpaid nonprofit internships may not 
be so safe for employers after all, and suggests that these internships should not be exempt 
from FLSA requirements for public policy reasons. 
This Comment argues that some, but not all, nonprofits deserve differential treatment 
with regard to internships given their budgetary constraints and the important role they play 
in society. It attempts to balance the policy concerns on both sides of the issue by proposing 
three narrow exceptions which track the Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of nonprofit 
organizations: one for interns supporting exempt purpose activities; another for interns 
working at organizations classified as public charities; and the last for interns at small 
nonprofits, as determined by their annual tax filing. This tax-based approach would be easy 
for nonprofits to apply and current law supports it. Finally, this Comment calls for legislative 
action to amend and clarify the FLSA by adopting one of these three exceptions. 
INTRODUCTION 
For college-educated young adults in the United States, internships 
have become a career rite of passage.
1
 The merits of a position are 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, LL.M, Taxation Candidate 2018, University of Washington School of 
Law. Thanks to Professors Lea B. Vaughn and Shannon Weeks McCormack for their thoughtful 
comments, and the Washington Law Review team for their outstanding editorial work. 
1. See Percentage of Students with Internship Experience Climbs, NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & 
EMP’RS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.naceweb.org/s10072015/internship-co-op-student-survey.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/NW9C-FJWB] (noting that sixty-five percent of those who graduated with a 
bachelor’s degree in 2015 participated in an internship and/or co-op). 
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obvious: résumé value, networking opportunities, exploration of a 
potential future career, and a path to a full-time position.
2
 Some say 
these benefits are compensation enough, particularly given the time and 
effort required to train interns for the often-short length of time they 
serve an organization.
3
 In the wake of the 2008 recession, these unpaid 




Eventually, the interns began to fight back.
5
 The grounds for their 
complaints lay in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which 
provides (among other things) a national minimum wage for covered 
employees.
6
 But the question remained—were interns “employees” 
under the FLSA? 
The FLSA’s definition of “employee” is murky at best.
7
 The 
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has put forth 
various guidance documents regarding individuals with questionable 
employment status, such as trainees, interns, and externs.
8
 But this 
agency guidance has not gone through the notice-and-comment process 
and lacks the force of law, so courts will defer to it only to the extent 
they find it persuasive.
9
 
Courts have spent decades trying to make sense of the “employee” 
question, and their opinions have resulted in little more than continued 
confusion across circuit lines.
10
 In 2015, the Second Circuit heard the 
now-quintessential intern case, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight,
11
 which 
                                                     
2. Heather R. Huhman, Why You Should Get a Summer Internship, U.S. NEWS: CAREERS (Apr. 
29, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2011/04/29/why-you-
should-get-a-summer-internship [https://perma.cc/MZY3-3EUR]. 
3. See Sanjay Sanghoee, Should All Interns Get Paid?, FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/04/17/should-all-interns-get-paid/ [https://perma.cc/YE9K-GTVA]. 
4. ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE BRAVE 
NEW ECONOMY xvii (2012). 
5. Maya Pope-Chappell, We Talked to the Black Swan Intern Who Sued Fox. He’s Not Giving 
Up., LINKEDIN: PULSE (July 10, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/former-unpaid-intern-who-
sued-fox-searchlight-speaks-pope-chappell [https://perma.cc/Y4WH-K8SV]. 
6. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
7. See id. § 203(e)(1); discussion infra section I.A. 
8. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (Apr. 2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm 
[https://perma.cc/42JA-S2B3] [hereinafter Fact Sheet #71]; 6 WAGES & HOURS MANUAL 91:156 
(2016) [hereinafter W&H MANUAL]. 
9. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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involved unpaid interns on the set of a big-budget, award-winning film.
12
 
In Fox Searchlight, the court outlined a new test for delineating interns 
from employees, at least in the narrow context of for-profit 
organizations.
13
 While companies are abuzz with the crisis of losing their 
unpaid interns, the case has resulted in nonprofits asking the same 
question: Do we have to pay interns now, too?
14
 
There is a persistent belief, propagated by the Department of Labor 
(DOL), that nonprofits are exempt from the strictures of the FLSA with 
regard to unpaid internships.
15
 This idea is supported by the policy 
argument that nonprofits, particularly charitable ones, deserve such an 
exception given their altruistic purposes and the important role they play 
in society.
16
 But this exception rests on unsteady legal ground, 
particularly in the wake of Fox Searchlight.
17
 Recent scholarship 
suggests that the Fox Searchlight decision is the “beginning of the end” 
for unpaid nonprofit internships.
18
 This Comment will argue that the 




Up to this point, scholarship surrounding nonprofit internships and the 
FLSA has focused only on blanket nonprofit exceptions and tests 
applicable to all nonprofits.
20
 This Comment will use statutory text, 
legislative history, Supreme Court precedent, and policy considerations 
                                                     
12. Id. at 532–33 (describing plaintiffs Eric Glatt, Alexander Footman, and Eden Antalik). 
13. Id. at 536. However, as will be explored in Part II, this test is not actually new at all. See Solis 
v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 
877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989). 
14. See Andrew J. Rotherham, The High Cost of Unpaid Internships, U.S. NEWS: OPINION (Apr. 
4, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/articles/2016-04-04/education-or-
exploitation -should-all-internships-be-paid [https://perma.cc/DVA2-C8RB]. 
15. See Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on Unpaid Law-Student Workers, 38 VT. L. REV. 
555, 600–01 (2014); Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8; Blair Hickman & Christie Thompson, When Is It 
OK to Not Pay an Intern?, PROPUBLICA (June 14, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-
interns-should-be-paid-explained [https://perma.cc/3ZZX-EU7K].  
16. See infra section III.B.2. 
17. See infra section III.C.1. 
18. See generally Thomas Johnson, Note, The Fox Searchlight Signal: Why Fox Searchlight 
Marks the Beginning of the End for Preferential Treatment of Unpaid Internships at Nonprofits, 102 
VA. L. REV. 1127 (2016). 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See Harthill, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 18; Maurice S. Pianko, Dealing with the 
Problem of Unpaid Interns and Nonprofit/Profit-Neutral Newsmagazines: A Legal Argument that 
Balances the Rights of America’s Hardworking Interns with the Needs of America’s Hardworking 
News Gatherers, 41 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 36–37 (2014); Anthony J. Tucci, Worthy Exemption? 
Examining How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public 
Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1384 (2012). 
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to show that a blanket exception is a misguided approach.
21
 As a novel 
alternative, it will propose three new, narrow nonprofit exceptions based 
in the Internal Revenue Code—the law governing the very existence of 
nonprofits—and advocate for Congress to adopt one of them.
22
 
Part I will explore the background of the FLSA and its requirements, 
what the text of the statute and limited Supreme Court precedent 
contribute to the interpretation of the “employee” definition, and the 
guidance the WHD has offered on the topic. Part II will survey the tests 
circuit courts have developed to classify interns and similar workers as 
employees or non-employees. Part III will apply these tests to nonprofit 
interns and examine the arguments for broadly exempting nonprofits 
from FLSA requirements. Finally, Part IV will advocate for a narrow 
exception derived from tax law. 
I. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT REQUIREMENTS FOR 
MINIMUM WAGE 
The FLSA was first proposed to Congress in 1932, amid the 
employment crisis of the Great Depression.
23
 After years of conflict 
between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress, the bill finally 
became law in 1938.
24
 By the time of its passage, political wrangling had 
narrowed the legislation to the point that it only applied to one-fifth of 
the U.S. working population,
25
 yet it introduced major standards that 
American workers would enjoy in the decades to come: the prohibition 
on child labor, a minimum wage, and overtime payment for non-exempt 
employees working more than forty hours in a week.
26
 While many 
perceive that its purpose was to eliminate harsh conditions for workers, 
it also targeted unemployment. Said one proponent of the law: 
“[U]nnecessarily long hours which wear out part of the working 
population . . . keep the rest from having work to do.”
27
 This job-creating 
                                                     
21. See infra section IV.A. 
22. See infra section IV.C. 
23. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum 
Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm 
[https://perma.cc/62TP-745K]. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.  
26. Id. At the time, however, the standard workweek was forty-four hours. Id. 
27. 81 CONG. REC. 1480 (1937) (statement of Sen. Minton). 
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sentiment has undergirded discussions of the FLSA’s scope ever since, 
including its application to internships.
28
 
The past eighty years have seen many changes and amendments to the 
FLSA: added provisions for overtime pay,
29
 the prohibition of various 
forms of discrimination,
30
 protection for migrant workers,
31
 and others. 
However, the law is still limited in one major aspect: It covers only 
individuals classified as “employees.”
32
 
Yet the term “employee,” as defined under the FLSA, is broad and 
ambiguous.
33
 Both the Supreme Court
34
 and the DOL
35
 have taken steps 
to clarify when individuals who are not treated as traditional employees 
by their employers are “employees” for the purposes of the FLSA. 
A. The FLSA’s Definition of “Employee” Is Ambiguous 
The relevant portion of the FLSA states the requirements for 
minimum wage: 
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods 
for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at 
the [rate of] . . . $7.25 an hour . . . .
36
 
                                                     
28. See, e.g., Katherine S. Newman, The Great Recession and the Pressure on Workplace Rights, 
88 CHI.-KENT L. REV 529, 531 (2013) (“We have seen growth in reliance on contingent/temporary 
workers and unpaid interns, which typically provide few job protections and no benefits to such 
employees, as well as negatively impact the wages and bargaining power of the core labor force and 
overall job creation.”). 




32. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #14: Coverage Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) (July 2009), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs14.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A4ZD-E4R5]. Employees may fall under the auspices of the FLSA as either part 
of an enterprise or as an individual, but due to the broad scope of individual coverage, nearly all 
employees are covered individually regardless of the size or business of their employer. See Fair 
Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012). This Comment will primarily concern 
itself with nonprofit interns as covered individuals. 
33. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
34. See Portland Terminal v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); Tony & Susan Alamo 
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); discussion infra section II.B. 
35. See Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8 and discussion infra section II.C. 
36. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). The section provides three different rates with staggered starts beginning 
in 2007; the current rate is $7.25. Id. 
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In the definitions section of the statute, “employee” is defined as “any 
individual employed by an employer.”
37
 The FLSA lists several 
exceptions to this broad definition, including family members engaged 
in agriculture and volunteers.
38
 However, the volunteer exception is very 
narrow; it only expressly extends to individuals who volunteer for (1) a 




The text’s definition of “employ” is the broadest of all: “to suffer or 
permit to work.”
40
 Understandably, the limits of this five-word phrase 
have required substantial judicial interpretation and incited a great deal 
of scholarly debate. 
B. The United States Supreme Court Narrowed the Definition of 
“Employee” in Portland Terminal and Alamo Foundation 
Despite the numerous lower court cases on the “employee” definition, 
the Supreme Court has only heard a handful of cases on the issue, and 
only two of them are relevant here.
41
 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.
42
 
addressed the question of when a trainee is an employee in the for-profit 
context, while Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of 
Labor
43
 considered whether participants in a nonprofit rehabilitation 
program are employees.
44
 Together, the two opinions primarily focused 
on three factors: (1) whether the organization and individual had agreed 
to some form of compensation;
45
 (2) which party received the 
                                                     
37. Id. § 203(e)(1). 
38. Id. § 203(e)(2)–(5). 
39. Id. § 203(e)(4)–(5). 
40. Id. § 203(g). 
41. Other cases which are beyond the scope of this Comment include Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) (holding that pharmaceutical sales reps fell under the “outside 
salesmen” exemption and were not employees); Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 517 U.S. 392 
(1996) (holding that live-haul livestock workers were employees and not exempt as agricultural 
workers); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (evaluating the independent 
contractor-or-employee question); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) (holding 
that “[t]he time or mode of compensation, in other words, does not control the determination of 
whether one is an employee within the meaning of the Act”); and Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal 
Co., 315 U.S. 386 (1942) (holding that redcaps at railroad stations were employees). 
42. 330 U.S. 148 (1947). The Court also heard and decided Walling v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 
a case with essentially the same facts, on the same day by applying the Portland Terminal holding. 
330 U.S. 158 (1947). 
43. 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
44. Id. at 291–92. 
45.Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 300–02; Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 151–53. 
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“immediate advantage” from the individual’s work;
46
 and (3) whether 
the activities the individual’s work supported were of a commercial or 
charitable nature.
47
 Despite the age of these decisions,
48
 both opinions 
offer key guidance to determining whether interns are employees under 
the FLSA. 
1. Portland Terminal Looks for Agreement to Compensation and 
“Immediate Advantage” in the Context of Railroad Trainees 
Portland Terminal, a case originally brought in the Federal District 
Court of Maine at the end of World War II,
49
 involved railroad brakemen 
who received a training course prior to entering full-time work in the 
field.
50
 This preliminary training lasted roughly a week and included 
observations of brakemen in their regular activities, followed by 
completion of “actual work under close scrutiny.”
51
 The railroad did not 
guarantee full-time positions to brakemen who completed the training 
course; however, brakemen had to complete the course to be considered 
for full-time positions.
52
 The Court noted that the trainees’ work did not 
displace that of full-time employees or “expedite the company[’s] 
business”; rather, it had quite the opposite effect.
53
 
The Court began its analysis by further noting that the FLSA 
contained a provision for flexible wages for trainees and apprentices but 
concluded that “the section carries no implication that all instructors 
must either get a permit or pay minimum wages to all learners; the 
section only relates to learners who are in ‘employment,’” and turned to 
the definition of “employ” found in section 3(g).
54
 The Court determined 
that Congress intended that definition to be broad enough “to insure that 
every person whose employment contemplated compensation should not 
be compelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed minimum 
wage,” but not so broad as to include “all persons . . . who, without any 
express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own 
                                                     
46. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 153. 
47. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 295–99. 
48. Alamo Foundation was decided in 1985. Id. at 290. Portland Terminal was decided in 1947. 
Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 148. 
49. Portland Terminal v. Portland Terminal Co., 61 F. Supp. 345 (D. Me. 1945). 
50. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 148. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 150. 
53. Id. (noting that trainees’ work “may, and sometimes does, actually impede and retard” 
company business). 
54. Id. at 152. 
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advantage on the premises of another.”
55
 The Court took particular issue 
with the fact that the brakemen trainees could have received the same 
training in a vocational school “wholly disassociated” from the railroad, 
in which case no one could have reasonably argued that they were 
railroad employees.
56
 It also highlighted that the railroad received no 




2. Alamo Foundation Considers Agreement to Compensation and the 
Nature of Work Activities in the Context of Rehabilitation Program 
Participants 
Nearly forty years after Portland Terminal, the Court revisited the 
“employee” definition in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. 
Secretary of Labor.
58
 The defendant was a private religious foundation 
which, among other activities, rehabilitated “drug addicts, derelicts, 
[and] criminals.”
59
 The Foundation did not receive support from the 
public and instead funded itself by operating several business ventures 
including a motel, hog farms, and retail stores.
60
 Individuals involved in 
the rehabilitation program, known as “associates,” provided the majority 
of staffing for these businesses.
61
 The associates received benefits 
including housing, food, and clothing, but were not paid wages.
62
 
The Court evaluated three questions in its review of the case: first, 
whether a nonprofit such as the foundation could be considered an 
“enterprise” under the FLSA; second, if the associates were employees 
and therefore entitled to minimum wage; and third, if application of the 
FLSA to the Foundation would infringe on the organization’s religious 
freedom under the First Amendment.
63
 Only the first two issues are 
relevant to this Comment. 
In determining whether or not the associates were employees of the 
Foundation, the Court referenced its holding in Portland Terminal.
64
 
                                                     
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 152–53. 
57. Id. at 153. 
58. 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 




63. Id. at 291–92. 
64. Id. at 300. 
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Like the railroad trainees, the Foundation associates had no expectation 
of compensation.
65
 But unlike the trainees, associates worked for the 
Foundation for months, not days, and received in-kind benefits as part of 
their arrangement.
66
 These benefits, the Court held, created an “implied” 
compensation agreement and were “wages in another form.”
67
 The true 
test of employment hinged on the “economic reality” of the situation, 
and an implied agreement indicated an employer-employee relationship 
as much as an express one would.
68
 
The “enterprise” question derives from the fact that the FLSA may 
cover employees in one of two ways: as individuals or as part of an 
enterprise.
69
 Whereas individual coverage applies to any individual who 
is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 
enterprise coverage requires that the employer business have gross 




Here, the Court noted that the statute contained no express exception 
for commercial activities conducted by nonprofit or religious 
organizations, and that it had been “consistently construed . . . ‘liberally 
to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional 
direction.’”
71
 It also gave deference to the Labor Department’s 
regulations, which state that “where [religious] organizations engage in 
ordinary commercial activities, . . . the business activities will be treated 
under the Act the same as when they are performed by the ordinary 
business enterprise.”
72
 In addition, the Court referenced the legislative 
history of the Act, which indicated an intent to exclude non-commercial 
activities of nonprofits, but not to create a blanket exemption for 
nonprofits.
73
 The Court concluded that “the Foundation’s businesses 
serve the general public in competition with ordinary commercial 
enterprises,” and were therefore enterprises under the FLSA.
74
 It noted, 
however, that FLSA coverage of these activities would not “lead to 
                                                     




69. Fair Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012). 
70. Id. 
71. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 296 (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 
207, 211 (1959)). 
72. 29 C.F.R § 779.214 (2012). 
73. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 297–98. For further discussion, see infra section IV.A. 
74. Id. at 299. 
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coverage of volunteers who drive the elderly to church, serve church 
suppers, or help remodel a church home for the needy”; it reached only 
the “ordinary commercial activities” of such organizations, and the 
Court’s interpretation would not threaten “ordinary volunteerism.”
75
  
C. The WHD Develops a Six-Part Test 
In the wake of the Portland Terminal decision, the WHD outlined a 
six-part test for determining whether trainees were employees for the 
purposes of the FLSA.
76
 As internships became a widely accepted part 
of education and career development, the WHD revisited the test and 
developed Fact Sheet #71, which applies the same six factors to unpaid 
internships.
77
 The test is substantively the same, save for slightly 
different language that reflects the new terminology.
78
 The test draws 
upon factors provided in Portland Terminal and consists of the 
following criteria: 
(1) The internship, even though it includes actual operation of 
the facilities of the employer, is similar to training which 
would be given in an educational environment; 
(2) The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
(3) The intern does not displace regular employees, but works 
under close supervision of existing staff; 
(4) The employer that provides the training derives no 
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern; and 
on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; 
(5) The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the 
conclusion of the internship; and 
(6) The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not 
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.
79
 
The Fact Sheet makes clear that the WHD expects employers to meet 
all of the factors to avoid having their interns classified as employees.
80
 
It also specifies that the test is only applicable to for-profit internships,
81
 
but contains one footnote referencing non-profits: 
                                                     
75. Id. at 302–03. 
76. W&H MANUAL, supra note 8. 
77. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8. 
78. Exchanged terminology includes “intern” instead of “trainee,” “educational environment” 
instead of “vocational school,” etc. See W&H MANUAL, supra note 8. 
79. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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The FLSA makes a special exception under certain 
circumstances for individuals who volunteer to perform services 
for a state or local government agency and for individuals who 
volunteer for humanitarian purposes for private non-profit food 
banks. WHD also recognizes an exception for individuals who 
volunteer their time, freely and without anticipation of 
compensation for religious, charitable, civic, or humanitarian 
purposes to non-profit organizations. Unpaid internships in the 
public sector and for non-profit charitable organizations, where 
the intern volunteers without expectation of compensation, are 
generally permissible. WHD is reviewing the need for additional 
guidance on internships in the public and non-profit sectors.
82
 
While this guidance is clear on its face, it is unfortunately only that—
guidance. As the agency tasked with implementing the FLSA, the DOL 
is afforded some deference when it interprets that statute.
83
 The amount 
of deference the interpretation receives depends on how the agency takes 
action.
84
 A regulation, for example, must go through a lengthy public 
comment process or formal adjudication before it gains the force of 
law.
85
 Once it does, courts will defer to the DOL’s interpretation as long 
as (1) the statute has not unambiguously spoken to the issue and (2) the 
interpretation is “a permissible construction” of the statute.
86
 This 
process is known as “Chevron” deference, for the case from which it is 
derived.
87
 If a court determines in the first step that the statute is clear on 
its face, the DOL interpretation becomes irrelevant, and there is no need 
to consider the second step.
88
 Informal guidance such as a WHD fact 
sheet, however, does not proceed from notice and comment rulemaking 
and is therefore only entitled to “Skidmore” deference: deference to the 
extent courts find the guidance persuasive.
89
 As will be discussed in Part 
II, the circuit courts have disagreed over how persuasive they find the 
trainee test and Fact Sheet #71.
90
 The result is confusion as to how the 
tests should be applied—and if they should even be applied at all. 
                                                     
82. Id. at n.1. 
83. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
84. Id.  
85. Id. 
86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
87. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 225 (using the term “Chevron deference” and citing 
Chevron, 467 U.S. 837). 
88. Chevron, 467 U.S at 842–43. 
89. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
90. See infra Part II. 
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II. THE CIRCUIT COURTS ARE DIVIDED AS TO HOW TO 
CLASSIFY INTERNS AND COMPARABLE WORKERS 
UNDER THE FLSA 
In the decades since Portland Terminal, Alamo Foundation, and the 
publication of the WHD’s guidance, many of the federal appellate courts 
have considered whether trainees, interns, and other similar individuals 
are employees under the FLSA.
91
 These courts deliberated how much 
deference to give the WHD’s guidance, how persuasive they found the 
guidance, how to apply the six factors (if at all), and ultimately, which 
test to use in classifying these workers.
92
 
In Fox Searchlight, the Second Circuit became the first—and to date, 
only—circuit court to specifically address interns in the context of FLSA 
wage requirements.
93
 “Intern” certainly has a different connotation than 
“trainee” or “extern,”
94
 but the similarities between the positions would 
undoubtedly lead other circuits to look to their own precedent before 
following the Fox Searchlight holding.
95
 The WHD’s guidance on 
interns is modeled almost word-for-word after its guidance on trainees,
96
 
and if a court previously found WHD guidance on trainees to be 
persuasive, it seems likely it will do so again with WHD guidance on 
interns. 
                                                     
91. Compare Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(granting deference), and Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993) (granting 
deference), and Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1983) (granting deference), 
with Glatt v. Fox Searchlight, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (no deference), and Solis v. 
Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011) (no deference), and McLaughlin 
v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989) (no deference). 
92. See supra Part II. 
93. Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 535. 
94. Compare Intern, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
intern [https://perma.cc/MQQ7-RRAZ] (defining “intern” as, among other things, “a student or 
recent graduate who works for a period of time at a job in order to get experience”), with Trainee, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trainee [https://perma.cc/ 
ML3A-D5YY] (defining “trainee” as “one that is being trained especially for a job”); Jacquelyn 
Smith, Externships: What They Are and Why They’re Important, FORBES (May 30, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/05/30/externships-what-they-are-and-why-
theyre-important/#f85f84e5100c [https://perma.cc/42VN-PR7M] (describing externships as “short-
term, unpaid ‘shadowing’ experience[s]”). See also Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 537–38 
(concluding that the Portland Terminal test for trainees was inapplicable to modern internships). 
95. See, e.g., Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290–91 (2016) (declining 
to follow Fox Searchlight and instead looking to its own precedent). Likewise, in its opinion on Fox 
Searchlight, the Second Circuit neglected to cite to any other circuits’ precedent regarding 
deference to the WHD test. Stephen E. Smith, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight and the Rhetorical Value of 
Inter-Circuit Dialogue, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. F. 479, 485–87 (2016). 
96. Compare Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, with W&H MANUAL, supra note 8. 
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The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found the WHD’s 
guidance persuasive and relied upon the six-factor test.
97
 The Second, 
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have rejected WHD guidance and adopted 
their own approaches, primarily centered around the “primary 
beneficiary” of the work.
98
 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits fall 
somewhere in between, choosing to home in on two of the WHD’s 
factors: immediate benefit and agreement for compensation.
99
 Only the 
First, Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have yet to explore this issue in 
any depth post-Portland Terminal.
100
 
This Comment is not intended to evaluate the merits of any particular 
test noted within this Part. Rather, this Part will summarize the current, 
muddled state of the law as applied to all internships, paving the way for 
a discussion of nonprofit internships in Part III. 
A. The Fifth, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits Embrace the WHD’s Six-
Part Test 
Three circuits have granted some level of deference to the WHD and 
directly applied the six-part test.
101
 Within this group a split exists 
between those that believe all factors must be met to preclude employee 
classification and those that do not.
102
 
                                                     
97. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834–35 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993); Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983). 
98. Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 536; Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 
525 (6th Cir. 2011); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209–10 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989). 
99. Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996); Donovan v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 726 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1984). 
100. The Seventh Circuit, however, did recently decline to apply the Second Circuit’s Fox 
Searchlight test to student athletes on the grounds that the factors did not “take into account . . . the 
reality of the student-athlete experience” and “‘fail[ed] to capture the true nature of the relationship’ 
between student athletes and their schools.” Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 
291 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)). The athletes 
argued that they were analogous to interns; however, the court glossed over the idea of a multifactor 
test and instead looked to DOL guidance with regard to treatment of college students participating 
in extracurricular activities. Id. at 293. Berger will not be discussed in any detail in this Comment. 
101. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128; Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834–35; Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026.  
102. Compare Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128, with Reich, 992 F.2d. at 1026. 
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1. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits Use an “All-or-Nothing” 
Approach 
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have both looked to the WHD’s six-
part test and determined that an individual must meet all six factors to 
avoid being an “employee.”
103
 
The Fifth Circuit first took note of the six-part test in Donovan v. 
American Airlines,
104
 a case involving airline trainees who were being 
trained at a school affiliated with the employer company.
105
 The fact 
pattern was substantially similar to that of Portland Terminal, so much 
so that the court stated “if we return to the Portland Terminal opinion 
and change the word ‘railroad’ to the word ‘airline,’ the decision fits this 
case.”
106
 There, the WHD guidance was treated as almost supplementary 
to a conclusion the court had already reached based on its own logic and 
the parallelism with Portland Terminal.
107
 
But a year after the Donovan decision, the Fifth Circuit faced a 
similar case involving trainees that was not so straightforward. In Atkins 
v. General Motors Corp.,
108
 the Court went immediately to the six-part 
test, expressly stating that “the [WHD] Administrator’s interpretation is 
entitled to substantial deference by this court.”
109
 Five of the six criteria 
were already met in Atkins and were not in dispute.
110
 The fourth 
criterion, regarding the employer receiving “no immediate advantage 
from the trainees’ activities[,]” was the determinative issue.
111
 While the 
court did not explicitly say that they were applying an all-or-nothing 
approach to the test, the prior decision of the district court had stated that 
                                                     
103. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128; Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834–35. 
104. Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 268 (5th Cir. 1982). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 272. 
107. Id. at 273 (noting after reaching conclusion, “the Wage and Hour Administrator’s 
interpretation of Portland Terminal supports the district court’s conclusion”). 
108. 701 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1983). 
109. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128. Because Atkins was decided prior to Chevron, the opinion does not 
discuss or apply Chevron deference. It is, however, the only circuit-level precedent where a court 
has found the WHD guidance entitled to the high level of deference now associated with Chevron. 
The holding indicates that were Atkins to be decided post-Chevron, the court would still follow the 
WHD guidance, but would do so from the sense that it found the guidance to be “persuasive.” 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
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“the absence of any one of [the six factors] signals ‘employee’ status,”
112
 
and the Fifth Circuit did not refute this interpretation.
113
 
The Eleventh Circuit also looked to the WHD’s six-part test in 
Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing and Coding.
114
 Kaplan is closer to the 
unpaid intern debate than many of the “trainee” cases because it 
involved students who were required to complete an externship while 
enrolled at a medical billing college.
115
 Like the Fifth Circuit in 
Donovan, the Kaplan Court treated the test as supplementary support of 
its conclusion,
116
 which was based primarily off of an “economic 
realities” test—a test that originated in the Fifth Circuit.
117
 While the 
court did not expressly say that all six factors had to be met, a footnote 
in the case includes the six factors and states that “[u]nder the 
Administrator’s test, a trainee is not an ‘employee’ if these six factors 
apply.”
118
 This footnote implied that if the test is to be applied, all 
factors must be met.
119
 
2. The Tenth Circuit Uses a “Totality of the Circumstances” 
Approach 
Unlike the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Tenth Circuit does not 
require all six factors to be met to avoid “employee” status. Instead, the 
circuit applies a “totality of the circumstances” approach, as 
demonstrated in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District.
120
 
The case involved firefighter trainees who sought wages for the time 
they were enrolled in the defendant’s training academy.
121
 The trainees 
met five of the six criteria but contended that they were employees 
because there was an expectation of full-time work at the end of the 
course.
122
 The relevant issues on appeal were (1) what test should be 
                                                     
112. Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 524 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. La. 1981), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 701 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1983). 
113. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128. 
114. 504 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013). 
115. Id. at 832–33. 
116. Id. at 834–35. 
117. Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 470 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Weisel 
v. Sing. Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
118. Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834 n.2. 
119. Id. 
120. 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993). 
121. Id. at 1025. 
122. Id. at 1026. 
17 - Pryjmak.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/8/2017  11:07 AM 
1086 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1071 
 
applied to distinguish employees from trainees under the FLSA, and (2) 
how strictly the WHD’s six-factor test should be applied.
123
 
The Tenth Circuit found that the DOL was not entitled to a high level 
of deference with regard to either the test or its interpretation of how the 
test should be applied.
124
 The Court still concluded that the WHD test 
was the “relevant[,] but not conclusive” test to differentiate trainees from 
employees and that the district court had applied the proper legal 
standard by using the test.
125
 The Court noted that “[t]he six criteria in 
the Secretary’s test were derived almost directly from Portland 
Terminal” and had consistently been used by both the WHD and other 
courts.
126
 However, it was not persuaded to strictly apply an all-or-
nothing approach to the test because there was “nothing in Portland 
Terminal to support” such an approach.
127
 The introductory language to 
the WHD test further supported this view: “Whether trainees are 
employees . . . will depend upon all of the circumstances surrounding 
their activities on the premises of the employer.”
128
 Furthermore, the 
court’s own precedent in the “analogous situation” of distinguishing an 
independent contractor from an employee had used other “totality of the 
circumstances” tests.
129
 Ultimately, the court determined firefighter 
trainees were not employees, despite expecting full time employment at 
the conclusion of the training course.
130
 
B. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Look to Immediate Benefit and 
Agreement for Compensation 
Where the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits relied heavily on the 
WHD test, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits seemed content to 
acknowledge the test, then pick and choose which factors from it to 
apply. 
The Eighth Circuit has had little to say on the issue save for one case: 
Donovan v. Trans World Airlines.
131
 The facts were substantially similar 
to the Fifth Circuit’s case of Donovan v. American Airlines and involved 
                                                     
123. Id. at 1024. 
124. Id. at 1026.  
125. Id. at 1027. 
126. Id. at 1026. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1027 (quoting W&H MANUAL, supra note 8). 
129. Id. (quoting Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 (10th Cir.1989)). 
130. Id. at 1029. 
131. 726 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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flight attendant trainees who received food, lodging, and other benefits 
during a four-week training period.
132
 The district court looked to 
American Airlines for guidance and acknowledged the WHD test, but its 
read of the opinion focused primarily on who received the “immediate 
benefit” of the work.
133
 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit mentioned the 
district court’s conclusion that Trans World Airlines (TWA) trainees 
were not employees “because TWA received no immediate benefit from 
their efforts during training[]” and stated simply that “[a]fter careful 
examination of the record, . . . we affirm on the basis of the district 
court’s analysis.”
134
 Neither the district court nor court of appeals 
expressly discussed what level of deference to give to the DOL or 
whether they found the WHD test persuasive. The Eighth Circuit has not 
explored the issue further in the twenty-plus years since this decision. 
The Ninth Circuit heard a case similar to Alamo Foundation in 
Williams v. Strickland.
135
 In Williams, the plaintiff was a resident at a 
Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center in San Francisco.
136
 As part 
of his treatment program, Williams received room, board, counseling, 
work therapy, and a small stipend (seven to twenty dollars per week) for 
six months.
137
 After being dismissed from the program for drinking, 
Williams sued the Salvation Army and alleged he was entitled to wages 
for his services during work therapy.
138
 
The majority looked to both Portland Terminal and Alamo 
Foundation and focused on the latter’s holding: that the expectation of 
benefits in exchange for services is the proper test in this case.
139
 It 
found that Williams had neither an express nor implied agreement for 
compensation and was therefore not an employee.
140
 The dissenting 
judge, however, seemed to call attention to a question of economic 
benefit, noting that “a material dispute of fact remained regarding the 
Salvation Army’s claim that Williams’s labor was purely rehabilitative 
and served only his own interest, producing no immediate economic 
                                                     
132. Id. at 416. 
133. Donovan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 77-0881-CV-W-9, 1983 WL 2017, at *9 (W.D. 
Mo. Mar. 4, 1983), aff’d, 726 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1984). 
134. Trans World Airlines, 726 F.2d at 416–17. 
135. 87 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1996). 
136. Id. at 1065. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1067. 
140. Id. 
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benefit to the Salvation Army.”
141
 Neither the majority nor the dissent 
referenced the WHD test. 
While the Ninth Circuit has yet to expressly state that these two parts 
make up the definitive employee test for the jurisdiction, at least one 
lower court has interpreted the Williams holding as a dual test: (1) 
whether the employer received an “immediate advantage” from the 
individual’s work and (2) whether there was an express or implied 
agreement for compensation.
142
 Other lower courts in the Ninth Circuit 
have ignored the Williams holding entirely and arrived at the WHD test 
after looking to more on-point cases in other circuits, such as American 
Airlines and Atkins.
143
 In sum, it is not entirely clear which test the Ninth 
Circuit has adopted. 
C. The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits Reject WHD Guidance and 
Focus on the “Primary Beneficiary” of the Individual’s Work 
Unlike the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second, Fourth, 
and Sixth Circuits have not found WHD guidance persuasive. Instead 
they have adopted their own tests, which primarily ask: Who is the 
primary beneficiary of the possible employee’s work? 
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to 
apply the “primary beneficiary” test to trainees, long before the Second 
Circuit would put it to use in Fox Searchlight.
144
 That case, McLaughlin 
v. Ensley,
145
 centered on “routemen”—workers who restocked vending 
machines and sold snacks to retailers on behalf of a food distributor.
146
 
Before being hired for a full-time position, potential routemen 




The district court applied the six-part test and concluded that the 
workers were not employees.
148
 But, on appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
looked to its own precedent in interpreting Portland Terminal with 
                                                     
141. Id. at 1069 (Poole, J., dissenting). 
142. Nance v. May Trucking Co., No. 3:12-CV-01655-HZ, 2014 WL 199136, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 
15, 2014). 
143. See Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Ulrich v. 
Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. C07-1215RSM, 2009 WL 364056, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2009). 
144. McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 1208. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 1210.  
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regard to underpaid workers.
149
 In those cases the court had held that 
“when the employer received no immediate advantage from the trainees’ 
services, that is, when the principal purpose of the seemingly 
employment relationship was to benefit the person in the employee 
status, the worker could not be brought under the Act.”
150
 The court 
looked to who was the “primary beneficiary” of the workers’ labor and 
found that in the case of Ensley, it was the employer; therefore, the 
workers were entitled to FLSA protection.
151
 The majority opinion’s 
only comment on the lower court’s use of the six-part test was in a 
footnote that stated “[w]e do not rely on the formal six-part test issued 
by the Wage and Hour Division. Instead, because of the clear precedent 
of [this court], we believe proper analysis derives from the principles 
stated in those cases.”
152
 One judge from the panel dissented, saying that 
the six-part test was the correct standard to apply because it was “a 
reasonable application of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Portland 
Terminal and entitled to deference.”
153
 
More than twenty years later, the Sixth Circuit came up against the 
issue in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School.
154
 Laurelbrook, a 
nonprofit corporation, operated a boarding high school and nursing 
home facility (“the sanitarium”).
155
 Students at the school participated in 
vocational courses, the curriculum of which included work at the 
sanitarium.
156
 Laurelbrook operated the sanitarium purely for the 
purposes of training students.
157
 
In an excellent summary of this issue, the Sixth Circuit stated that 
“[t]here is no settled test for determining whether a student is an 
employee for purposes of the FLSA.”
158
 The district court did not 
comment on the WHD’s test, instead concluding that under Portland 
Terminal the appropriate question was whether the student or the school 
received the primary benefit.
159
 The Sixth Circuit, however, did address 
                                                     
149. Id. at 1209. 
150. Id. (quoting Isaacson v. Pa. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
151. Id. at 1209–10. 
152. Id. at 1209 n.2. 
153. Id. at 1211 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
154. 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011). 
155. Id. at 520. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 521. 
159. Id. 
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the six-part test, acknowledging the myriad stances other courts had on 
the subject.
160
 It found the “WHD’s test to be a poor method for 
determining employee status in a training or educational setting[],” 
noting that “it [was] overly rigid and inconsistent with a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach,” and “inconsistent with Portland Terminal 
itself.”
161
 And while the Court had previously “not directly spoken to the 
issue,” it had “suggested that identifying the primary beneficiary of a 
relationship [would provide] the appropriate framework for determining 
employee status in the educational context.”
162
 
In 2015, the Second Circuit decided the case at hand: Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight.
163
 In Fox Searchlight, plaintiffs were initially three 
individuals working as unpaid interns either on the Fox Searchlight film 
Black Swan, or in the corporate offices of Fox Searchlight (a for-profit 
company).
164
 Two of the three were not enrolled in degree programs, 
while the third was supposed to receive credit for her internship but 
never did.
165
 Eventually, the district court certified two classes of 
plaintiffs: New York State interns working at several Fox divisions and 
nationwide interns working at those same divisions.
166
 
The district court applied the WHD test under a “totality of the 
circumstances” approach to determine whether the interns were 
employees.
167
 The court found that four of the six factors weighed 
toward plaintiffs being employees while the remaining two factors 
weighed toward them being trainees.
168
 On this basis the lower court 
found plaintiffs to be employees entitled to FLSA protection.
169
 
On appeal, plaintiffs advocated for a test of whether or not the 
employer receives “immediate advantage” from the interns’ work, while 
defendants pushed for a primary beneficiary test.
170
 The DOL filed an 
amicus brief defending the WHD test (now formulated in Fact Sheet 
#71)
171
 along with an all-or-nothing approach to applying it.
172
 The 
                                                     
160. Id. at 524–25. 
161. Id. at 525. 
162. Id. at 526 (citing Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 668 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
163. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016). 
164. Id. at 531–32. 
165. Id. at 532–33. 
166. Id. at 533. 
167. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
168. Id. at 532–34. 
169. Id. at 534. 
170. Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 535. 
171. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8. 
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Second Circuit rejected the WHD test on the basis that it was only 
entitled to Skidmore deference, and that it was “too rigid for [the court’s] 
precedent to withstand” while “attempt[ing] to fit Portland Terminal’s 
particular facts to all workplaces.”
173
 The court accepted the primary 
beneficiary test because it focused “on what the intern receive[d] in 
exchange for his work,” gave “courts the flexibility to examine the 
economic reality as it exists between the intern and the employer,” and 
“acknowledge[d] that the intern-employer relationship should not be 
analyzed in the same manner as the standard employer-employee 
relationship.”
174
 The court also suggested a list of non-dispositive factors 
that could assist in making this determination: 
1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly 
understand that there is no expectation of compensation. 
Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests 
that the intern is an employee—and vice versa. 
2. The extent to which the internship provides training that 
would be similar to that which would be given in an 
educational environment, including the clinical and other 
hands-on training provided by educational institutions. 
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s 
formal education program by integrated coursework or the 
receipt of academic credit. 
4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the 
intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the 
academic calendar. 
5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to 
the period in which the internship provides the intern with 
beneficial learning. 
6. The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather 
than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing 
significant educational benefits to the intern. 
7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand 
that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a 
paid job at the conclusion of the internship.
175
 
                                                     
172. Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 535–36. 
173. Id. at 536. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 536–37. 
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The court then remanded the case to the district court for further fact-
finding under the new test.
176
 In July 2016, Fox and the interns reached a 
settlement agreement rather than return to trial.
177
 
As this Part indicates, for all the excitement surrounding Fox 
Searchlight, the law does not have one clear rule for internships.
178
 The 
obvious place an employer would first look for guidance—the WHD—
cannot be relied upon in all jurisdictions.
179
 Currently any organization, 
for-profit or nonprofit, that wishes to hire an intern must either pay them 
or engage in a highly fact-specific inquiry based on the case law in its 
jurisdiction.
180
 This inquiry may be further complicated for nonprofits 
due to uncertainty surrounding a possible nonprofit exception.
181
 
III. REGARDLESS OF THE TEST APPLIED TO FOR-PROFIT 
INTERNS, NONPROFIT INTERNS MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER 
A BROAD EXCEPTION FOR CHARITABLE NONPROFITS 
While most recent discussion has focused on unpaid internships at 
for-profit organizations, little has been written about their nonprofit 
counterparts.
182
 Of the handful of scholarly pieces on the subject, only 
one Note has commented on the issue since Fox Searchlight.
183
 The 
WHD appears to support a broad nonprofit exception to intern wage 
requirements, and some scholars agree that further legal support exists 
for one.
184
 Others argue that in the wake of Fox Searchlight, no 
exception exists and nonprofits will be held to the same standard as for-
profits.
185




                                                     
176. Id. at 541. 
177. Dominic Patten, Fox Settles ‘Black Swan’ Interns Lawsuit After Five Years, DEADLINE 
HOLLYWOOD (July 12, 2016), http://deadline.com/2016/07/black-swan-intern-lawsuit-fox-settles-
1201785666/ [https://perma.cc/YVW3-2TNA]. 
178. See supra Part II. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Infra Part III. 
182. See Harthill, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 18; Pianko, supra note 20; Tucci, supra 
note 20. 
183. See Johnson, supra note 18. Johnson’s Note was published in June 2016, after the amended 
Fox Searchlight opinion was published in January 2016.  
184. See generally Harthill, supra note 15; Pianko supra note 20. 
185. See generally Johnson, supra note 18. 
186. Infra section III.C. 
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This Part will first attempt to apply the current for-profit tests to 
nonprofit internships and examine the effect this would have on 
organizations. It will then summarize the legal and policy arguments for 
and against a nonprofit exception, as articulated by scholars and other 
sources. 
A. Applying the Circuits’ Tests to Nonprofit Interns Yields the Same 
Confusion That It Does for Interns at For-Profits, but with More 
Problematic Results 
If no nonprofit exception exists, then nonprofits must evaluate their 
internship programs under the applicable circuit’s test for interns 
generally. As shown in Part II, the inquiry is very fact-specific, requires 
knowledge of the case law in a given circuit, and is subject to varying 
interpretation. 
To demonstrate the potential results of the current tests, consider a 
sample relationship between a nonprofit and its interns. The interns are 
recent graduates working thirty hours per week at a small environmental 
nonprofit. The nonprofit has four paid employees and two interns. 
Neither intern is paid but both receive free, modest shared housing just 
outside a high-rent area. The interns’ time is split between (1) shadowing 
and assisting paid staff with regular programs of the organization; (2) 
working on an intern-specific long-term project for the organization; and 
(3) basic, sometimes menial, office tasks. While items (1) and (3) would 
be completed by existing staff with or without the interns, item (2) 
would not be unless an additional employee was hired. During the 
internship, training is provided in many areas common to nonprofit 
management, including fundraising, program development, community 
interaction, and more. Internships are six months in length, but interns 
often stay on up to a month longer than planned. The interns do not 
expect a full-time job at the end of the internship, but the organization’s 
executive director is well known in the sector and can make connections 
for them afterward, pending good performance. 
In the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, these interns are likely employees. 
Because these circuits apply the all-or-nothing approach to the WHD 
tests, all six factors must be met for organizations to avoid having to 
comply with FLSA requirements.
187
 The interns receive educational 
training and they benefit from the internship, in terms of experience, 
skills development, and networking. The interns know they are not 
                                                     
187. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834–35 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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entitled to a full-time position. However, it is debatable whether the 
nonprofit derives immediate advantage from the interns or if the interns 
would be deemed to displace regular employees, given the intern-
specific project. Additionally, it is unclear how a court would rule on the 
agreement to wages question. Here there is no expectation of payment, 
but in-kind benefits in the form of housing are expected and exchanged. 
Given the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Portland Terminal that 
“implied compensation agreement[s]” could create an employment 
relationship,
188
 and the follow up in Alamo Foundation that in-kind 
benefits created an implied agreement and were just “wages in another 
form,”
189
 a court could very easily interpret “wages” broadly and 
conclude that this factor was met here. So, meeting all six factors would 
be a challenge for this internship program. 
The nonprofit might have better luck under the Tenth Circuit’s totality 
of the circumstances approach, where all six factors are not necessary.
190
 
One could argue that the educational components, benefit to intern, and 
temporary nature of the internship are enough to outweigh the other 
factors. Still, it is even less clear here than in the all-or-nothing 
approach, as it is impossible to accurately predict which factors the court 
might prioritize over others. 
In the Eighth or Ninth Circuits, where agreement to compensation and 
immediate benefit are the determining factors,
191
 the interns would 
probably be deemed employees, but again, the outcome is unclear. As 
noted above, there is certainly room for debate on both counts. 
Finally, the organization might have its best luck in the Second, 
Fourth, or Sixth Circuits. Focusing on the “primary beneficiary” still 
creates an open question, but there is a solid argument for the intern 
receiving the primary benefit here. The Fox Searchlight factors do not 
all work in the organization’s favor—most notably, those tying the 
internship to an academic program either by credit or the calendar 




Regardless of the test applied, one thing is obvious: It takes a lawyer 
to make sense of it, and even then, there is still room for an argument on 
                                                     
188. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). 
189. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985). 
190. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993). 
191. Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996); Donovan v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 726 F.2d 415, 416–17 (8th Cir. 1984). 
192. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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 Many nonprofits lack the resources to hire an attorney to 
help appropriately structure their internship program and do not want to 
risk a potential lawsuit.
194
 This sets such nonprofits apart from for-
profits, where the risk trade-off may be more palatable. Unless they are 
exempt from the murky tests, nonprofits are then left with two options: 
Pay interns, or do not have interns at all. The policy implications of 
these results will be further considered in section III.C. 
B. Scholars Disagree Whether a Broad Nonprofit Exception Exists 
Under Current Law 
A variety of legal arguments have been made both in support of and 
against the existence of an exception for all nonprofits.
195
 While no 
positive law expressly states such an exception, a court would likely 
consider many of these arguments if the question of a nonprofit 
exception were left up to judicial determination. 
1. Pianko and Harthill Argue That a Nonprofit Exception Exists 
The majority of scholars who have written on nonprofit internships 
have argued for an exception; however, their commentary pre-dates Fox 
Searchlight.
196
 Still, given the disarray among the circuits explored in 
Part II, many if not all of the authors’ arguments below remain viable 
and warrant consideration. Three scholars have explored the issue in 
some level of depth: Anthony J. Tucci, who examined it broadly;
197
 
Susan Harthill, who focused on unpaid internships among law 
students;
198




                                                     
193. See Interns: Employee or Volunteer, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, https://www.council 
ofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/interns-employee-or-volunteer [https://perma.cc/H4KT-JNC5]; 
Megan H. Mann & David R. Warner, Turns Out, There’s No Such Thing As “Free Labor” Either: 
Why Most Employers Should be Paying Interns or Modifying/Abandoning Their Unpaid Internship 
Programs, VENABLE LLP: LABOR AND EMP’T ALERT (June 2010), https://www.venable.com/ 
files/Publication/49ba8983-c152-420b-a574-4fa0d1bf37bd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
0a202d50-8f59-415e-96da-521aa6430a13/Internships.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT3T-2KRV]. 
194. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1154. 
195. See generally Harthill, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 18; Pianko, supra note 20. 
196. Harthill, supra note 15 (published in 2014); Pianko, supra note 20 (published in 2014); 
Tucci, supra note 20 (published in 2012). 
197. Tucci, supra note 20. 
198. Harthill, supra note 15. 
199. Pianko, supra note 20. 
17 - Pryjmak.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/8/2017  11:07 AM 
1096 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1071 
 
The most straightforward argument is that where the WHD test (and 
by extension, presumably Fact Sheet #71) has been considered 
persuasive, the footnoted statement—that unpaid internships at 
nonprofits are generally permissible—would also be considered 
persuasive enough for courts to follow. But as shown in Part II, only a 
handful of circuit courts have embraced the WHD test.
200
 If the Supreme 
Court were to resolve the circuit split in favor of the WHD, a nonprofit 
exception would almost be guaranteed. Alternatively, if the WHD ever 
decided to put Fact Sheet #71 through notice and comment proceedings, 
the included exception would be entitled to Chevron deference and hold 
more weight in all the circuit courts.
201
 No scholar has explicitly made 
this argument for a nonprofit exception, although Thomas Johnson relied 




In the alternative, Maurice Pianko argues that the DOL’s 
interpretation of the FLSA is irrelevant to nonprofit internships because 
under step one of a Chevron analysis, the statute has unambiguously 
provided that nonprofits may legally refrain from paying intern 
volunteers.
203
 In Portland Terminal and Alamo Foundation, he says, “the 
Supreme Court . . . interpreted the [FLSA] to mean that unpaid intern 
volunteers [at nonprofits] are legal because such volunteers without 
promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for their own 
pleasure, labor in the service of a cause that they believe in.”
204
 Pianko 
concludes that the Court’s statements in Portland Terminal and Alamo 
Foundation—that “any person who, solely for his personal purpose or 
pleasure, worked in activities (such as charities) was not an employee 
who had to be paid the minimum wage under the [FLSA]”—indicate 
that the Court viewed the question as one of law that Congress had 
already spoken to.
205
 Therefore, the Court decided that unpaid nonprofit 
interns were allowed under the first step of Chevron, and there was no 
need to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute was 
a permissible construction under the second step.
206
 
Susan Harthill argues that unpaid interns at nonprofits fall under the 
FLSA’s volunteer exception in spite of the lack of an express exemption 
                                                     
200. Supra Part II. 
201. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
202. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1140–41. 
203. Pianko, supra note 20, at 36. 
204. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).  
205. Id. at 32–33 (internal quotations omitted). 
206. Id. 
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for nonprofits outside of food banks.
207
 She states that the DOL has 
applied the exemption to other types of nonprofits through opinion 
letters and “courts have accepted this view.”
208
 Therefore, “nonprofits 
should remain safe from the threat of lawsuits.”
209
 That said, there is 
currently no clear line as to when nonprofit interns fall under the 
umbrella of nonprofit volunteers and when they do not. But, notes 
Harthill, “the DOL has consistently taken the position that volunteers 
include individuals who provide services to nonprofits . . . . [I]nterns at 
nonprofit organizations are thus probably considered ‘volunteers,’ but 
they fall into an illusory exemption.”
210
 
Harthill admits that her position is somewhat weak given the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision to ignore the volunteer exception in its discussion of 
the nonprofit corporation in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and 
School
211
 and the nonbinding nature of the DOL’s opinion letters.
212
 
However, her argument appears to be the prevailing view in favor of a 
nonprofit exception for interns.
213
 The congressional record of the 
discussion behind the food bank amendment further supports this 
position.
214
 The record shows the bill’s sponsor stating that the 
amendment “should not be in any way construed to mean 
that . . . Congress is showing an intent that any other individual who 
performs community services and receives benefits is an employee,” and 
a supporter responding that “[t]his incident [was] just one example of the 
fact that the Fair Labor Standards Act is flexible, [and] the Fair Labor 
Standards Act will yield to common sense after due deliberation.”
215
 If 
the FLSA was intended to be flexible, its flexibility may allow it to 
encompass not only more than the expressly mentioned nonprofits, but 
also individuals who serve them for no pay and with a title other than 
“volunteer.” 
                                                     
207. Harthill, supra note 15, at 660–62. 
208. Id. at 601. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011). 
212. Id. at 582–84. 
213. Id. at 601. 
214. 144 CONG. REC. H5386 (daily ed. June 25, 1998).  
215. Id. (statements of Reps. Ballenger and Owens). 
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2. Johnson Argues That a Nonprofit Exception Does Not Exist 
The primary scholarly voice against a nonprofit exception comes in a 
2016 Note by Thomas Johnson.
216
 Johnson argues that the exception 
rests on unstable legal ground, particularly following the outcome of Fox 
Searchlight.
217
 However, he neglects to take notice of the current circuit 
split demonstrated in Part II.
218
 
Johnson correctly points out that “[t]here is no positive law that 
suggests that unpaid interns at nonprofits are not ‘employees’ for the 
purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act.”
219
 The only text of the FLSA 
related to nonprofits provides a limited exception for those who 
volunteer at public agencies or nonprofit food banks.
220
 This exception 
was created after the Supreme Court articulated a broad exception in 
Alamo Foundation and would seem to indicate Congressional intent to 
narrow the exception; however, as discussed above, the legislative 
history is somewhat less clear on this point.
221
 Regardless, outside of the 
three examples provided in the Alamo Foundation exception and the 
situation at issue in the case,
222
 it is unclear where the Court would draw 
a line between ordinary volunteerism and employee activities absent 
definitive legislative or agency action. 
Johnson also points to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Alamo 
Foundation for support of his argument, given the Second Circuit’s 
reliance on it.
223
 He notes that the Alamo Foundation Court “directly 
rejected a blanket volunteer exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
for charitable nonprofits” and that “[i]f the Second Circuit found the 
logic of Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation persuasive in the context of 
unpaid interns at for-profit entities, it is highly likely that this precedent 
would weigh heavily . . . against the blanket intern exception for 
charitable nonprofits found in Fact Sheet #71.”
224
 Johnson interprets the 
                                                     
216. Johnson, supra note 18. 
217. Id. at 1128–29. 
218. Id. at 1139–43. 
219. Id. at 1140. 
220. Fair Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5) (2012). 
221. Alamo Foundation was decided in 1985, while the FLSA amendment was passed in 1998. 
See discussion supra section III.B.1. 
222. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302–03 (1985) 
(differentiating between “volunteers who drive the elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help 
remodel a church home for the needy” and self-described “volunteers” in the commercial ventures 
of a nonprofit). 
223. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1142. 
224. Id. 
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Alamo Foundation holding as saying that nonprofits and for-profits 
should be treated identically under the FLSA.
225
 
Johnson references the same conflicting legislative history as Harthill, 
but frames it from the perspective of the DOL’s inconsistent guidance on 
the subject.
226
 The Department indicates in Fact Sheet #71 that one of 
the key factors in the intern or employee question is whether the intern 
displaces paid employees.
227
 But in a later opinion letter, the Department 
stated that “even when volunteers do not displace paid labor at a 
nonprofit, if it is the type of labor that a for-profit competitor would have 
to pay for, the workers cannot be classified as volunteers.”
228
 Despite the 
fact that this is discussing volunteers rather than interns, this seems to be 
directly at odds with the Fact Sheet #71 footnote regarding unpaid 
nonprofit internships as “permissible.”
229
 Johnson points out that “these 
agency positions are only entitled” to persuasive deference under 
Skidmore and claims that “they undermine the argument that the Labor 
Department would support preferential treatment for charitable 
nonprofits under the volunteer exception.”
230
 
From Johnson’s perspective, the only thing keeping unpaid nonprofit 
internships afloat is Fact Sheet #71.
231
 As mentioned earlier, Fact Sheet 
#71 focuses primarily on unpaid internships at for-profits, but it includes 
a footnote stating that unpaid nonprofit internships are “generally 
permissible.”
232
 Johnson argues that because Fact Sheet #71 was thrown 
out by the Second Circuit, the belief in a nonprofit exception has nothing 
left to stand on: 
Fox Searchlight signals that nonprofits can no longer safely rely 
on Fact Sheet #71’s conclusory assertion as a bulwark against 
liability. Even the Labor Department conceded that Fact Sheet 
#71 is limited to the “power to persuade.” This should be highly 
disconcerting to charitable nonprofits, as the Labor 
Department’s attempts at persuasion failed at both the district 
                                                     
225. Id. at 1143 (following discussions of reliance on Alamo Foundation and Portland Terminal 
with the statement that “Fox Searchlight supports, in one additional way, the argument that courts 
will obey the Supreme Court’s guidance in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation to treat for-profits and 
nonprofits identically”). 
226. Id. at 1147. 
227. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8. 
228. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1147 (citing Volunteers/Employee Status, 6A WAGE & HOUR 
MANUAL (BNA), at WHM99:8191, 99:8191–92 (Nov. 9, 1998)).  
229. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8. 
230. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1147. 
231. Id. at 1140–41. 
232. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8. 
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court and circuit court levels in Fox Searchlight. There is no 
reason to think that the Labor Department’s terse assertion in a 
footnote will be more persuasive to courts than its developed, 




This is a bold statement, for it presumes that “the Labor Department’s 
attempts at persuasion”
234
 will fail at all circuit courts because they 
failed before the Second Circuit. As shown in Part II, several circuit 
courts have found the WHD’s trainee test persuasive enough to rely 
upon,
235
 and the WHD trainees test is nearly identical to 
Fact Sheet # 71.
236
 It is likely that at least those courts would find Fact 
Sheet #71 persuasive enough to follow, including the footnote reference 
to nonprofits. 
C. A Broad Exception Furthers Certain Policy Goals While Inhibiting 
Others 
Regardless of whether or not an exception currently exists, the 
question remains of whether one should. The true merits of the 
charitable sector are a subject of considerable debate
237
 and are beyond 
the scope of this Comment. This debate extends to the idea of exempting 
nonprofit internships from FLSA compliance.
238
 Still, Congress has 
determined that charities deserve subsidies, and that policy underlies the 
decision to exempt them from certain legal requirements.
239
 The 
question then becomes, how far should that exemption go? Considering 
the policy grounds of a broad exception forces an evaluation of who is 
more deserving: nonprofits, or the interns who serve them. 
                                                     
233. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1140–41. 
234. Id. at 1140. 
235. See supra section II.A. 
236. Compare Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, with W&H MANUAL, supra note 8. 
237. See, e.g., GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT 
ECONOMY 1–9 (1993) (noting that nonprofits subsidize inefficiency, hide wealth, and suffer from 
mission drift); Miranda Perry Fleischer, How Is an Opera Like a Soup Kitchen?, in THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW 256 (Monica Bhandari ed., 2017) (examining the 
paradox of the nonprofit tax exemption equally subsidizing both charities that serve the wealthy, 
like operas, and those that serve the poor, like soup kitchens). 
238. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1158–62. 
239. Perry Fleischer, supra note 237, at 256–62. 
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1. The Positive: A Broad Exception Furthers the Beneficial Work of 
the Nonprofit Sector and Provides More Opportunities for Interns 
Interested in Public Service 
A broad exception favors nonprofits and the policy interests they 
serve. The nonprofit, “independent,” or “third” sector has been widely 
regarded as an important gap-filler between the government and private 
sectors.
240
 Writes John Gardner, “Unlike government, an independent 
sector group need not ascertain that its idea or philosophy is supported 
by some large constituency, and unlike the business sector they do not 
need to pursue only those ideas which will be profitable.”
241
 The 
freedom from these two constraints thus allows nonprofits to meet 
societal needs that might otherwise go unaddressed, or to respond more 
quickly to issues where government bureaucracy would increase reaction 
time.
242
 This is to say nothing of the more philosophical argument for a 
nonprofit sector: that the existence of one is “uniquely American” and 
rooted in a long national philanthropic tradition.
243
 
The importance of this third sector begets a major policy argument for 
a nonprofit exception. If nonprofits are intended to fill a gap left by the 
for-profit market, then they should not be subjected to market forces 
with regard to labor.
244
 Many nonprofits are low-budget organizations 
that simply cannot afford to pay interns.
245
 Requiring them to do so 
could result in nonprofits substantially reducing or even cutting 
internship programs entirely.
246
 In some cases, where interns provide a 
cost-effective way to advance the mission of the organization, 
                                                     
240. LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 12–13 (2d ed. 1999). 
241. John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix, xiii (Brian 
O’Connell ed., 1983). 
242. Id. at xiii–xiv. 
243. Id. at ix; see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 975 (Henry Reeve 
trans., Auckland, The Floating Press 2009) (1840). De Tocqueville, in his 1835 tour of the United 
States, noted the presence and value of philanthropic ideals to the fledgling country:  
It would seem as if every imagination in the United States were upon the stretch to invent 
means of increasing the wealth and satisfying the wants of the public. The best-informed 
inhabitants of each district constantly use their information to discover new truths which may 
augment the general prosperity; and if they have made any such discoveries, they eagerly 
surrender them to the mass of the people. 
Id. 
244. Pianko, supra note 20, at 39. 
245. Kate Newman, For Interns at Nonprofits, Don’t Expect a Paycheck, ALJAZEERA AM. (Aug. 
25, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/25/nonprofit-interns.html [https://perma.cc/ 
C4DR-G8AN]; see also infra tbl.2 (showing roughly fifty percent of nonprofits have less than 
$100,000 in annual revenues or assets). 
246. Newman, supra note 245. 
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eliminating internships could effectively serve to reduce the power and 
reach of the nonprofit itself.
247
 Smaller organizations are likely to feel 
these effects the hardest—and they are the nonprofits who arguably are 
best positioned to achieve the goals of the third sector, as they tend to be 
nimbler and better attuned to local needs.
248
 
Forcing all nonprofits to pay interns would hinder not only 
organizations, but individuals seeking internships as well. While the 
focus of most discussion on the topic has been primarily on 
compensation-related benefits to interns, requiring payment would result 
in a tradeoff: fewer internships would be available, meaning fewer 
intangible benefits for interns.
249
 Furthermore, a lack of available 
positions could be a deterrent for possible interns otherwise interested in 
a career in public service.
250
 
2. The Negative: A Broad Exception Causes Inefficiency and 
Uncertainty While Perpetuating Income Inequality 
Broadly exempting nonprofits may advance nonprofit missions, but it 
raises policy concerns about the treatment of interns. Johnson pays heed 
to many of the policy arguments in favor of a nonprofit exception but 
also notes that “[t]he debate regarding the character of nonprofit 
organizations has raged for decades,” as to whether nonprofits “combine 
the civic and charitable qualities of government with the innovation and 
ingenuity of the private sector,” or “hid[e] wealth, subsidiz[e] 
inefficiencies, and suffer[] from chronic ‘mission drift.’”
251
 He points to 
                                                     
247. See, e.g., BARRY HESSENIUS, HARDBALL LOBBYING FOR NONPROFITS: REAL ADVOCACY 
FOR NONPROFITS IN THE NEW CENTURY 93 (2007) (“Unpaid internships . . . are an excellent way to 
provide [a] struggling advocacy organization with some of the help it requires.”); Interns: Employee 
or Volunteer, supra note 193 (“Interns can be terrific additions to a nonprofit’s capacity building 
journey . . . .”); Would College Interns Help Your Nonprofit?, GELMAN, ROSENBERG, & FREEDMAN 
(June 4, 2012), http://www.grfcpa.com/resources/articles/would-college-interns-help-your-nonprofit/ 
[https://perma.cc/B9CT-FCTJ] (“[S]tudents at the master’s level may be available to do a research 
project for you that would normally cost tens of thousands of dollars.”). 
248. Melissa Kushner, Small Nonprofits, Big Nonprofits: The Where to Give Dilemma, 
HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (July 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-kushner/ 
small-nonprofits-big-nonp_b_7905482.html [https://perma.cc/5PL7-VDKK] (“[S]mall nonprofits 
tend to bring an intimacy with the challenges faced in particular communities, which are culturally 
specific and unique.”); Marc Koenig, Famous Nonprofits Are Overrated: Three Advantages of 
Being a Small Nonprofit, NONPROFIT HUB (Feb. 18, 2013), http://nonprofithub.org/nonprofit-
marketing-plan/advantages-of-being-a-small-nonprofit/ [https://perma.cc/QV84-8L78] (noting 
“agility” as one of the advantages of a small nonprofit). 
249. Rotherham, supra note 14. 
250. Id. 
251. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1151–52. 
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three primary policy concerns implicated by a possible exception: (1) 
inefficiency, (2) uncertainty, and (3) economic inequality.
252
 
Johnson argues that allowing unpaid internships in the nonprofit 
sector leads to income stratification because it “privileges the upper 
class.”
253
 He points to the growth of intern placement agencies, which 
essentially require students to pay to have an unpaid internship, and the 
fact that students from wealthy families are more likely to have the 
economic support necessary to take on an unpaid internship.
254
 Johnson 
also alleges that nonprofits suffer from these effects as well because they 
are screening for interns with wealthy backgrounds rather than the best 
possible employees, and in the long run, this practice will discourage 
low-income applicants from later involvement in the nonprofit sector.
255
 
Nonprofits may be viewed as inefficient because while they are 
deemed a “gap-filler” (providing public goods where both the market 
and government have failed), in filling this gap they curtail profit motive 
and reduce incentives for cost efficiency.
256
 According to one statistic, 
the nonprofit sector “wastes $100 billion . . . annually” and some 
scholars argue that “the unregulated status of nonprofits allows 
inefficient entrepreneurs, who would be driven out of the for-profit 
market, to survive and draw a salary as long as they adopt nonprofit 
status.”
257
 Given these concerns, some have concluded that leveling the 
playing field between for-profits and nonprofits is necessary.
258
 




Johnson says that the current uncertainty surrounding the FLSA 
further compounds this inefficiency.
260
 The uncertainty leaves nonprofits 
with few options, none of which are particularly desirable: 
                                                     
252. Id. at 1152–58. 
253. Id. at 1155. 
254. Id. at 1155–58; see also Christopher Zara, Paying a Fee to Work for Free: Pricey Intern 
Placement Agencies Raise Eyebrows Among Fair Wage Advocates, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 12, 
2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/paying-fee-work-free-pricey-intern-placement-services-raise-eyebrows -
among-fair-wage-1686392 [https://perma.cc/38UF-T2ED]. 
255. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1156. However, Johnson cites no support for this assertion. 
256. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 507 
(1981). 
257. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1152–53 (citing Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector’s $100 
Billion Opportunity, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2003, at 94, 102; Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The 
Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2054 (2007)). 
258. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1153–55. 
259. Id. at 1154. 
260. Id. 
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Nonprofits must either pay their interns (which is possibly 
unnecessary), structure their internships to avoid liability under 
any of the plausible tests for the intern exception (which is 
tricky), place their faith in the narrowly drawn volunteer 
exception (which is risky), or rely on the Labor Department’s 
assertion in a footnote merely entitled to Skidmore deference 
that unpaid internships are “generally permissible.” Each of 
these choices has consequences, and a misstep could subject 
nonprofits to liability for unpaid wages.
261
 
In sum, Johnson’s point is that acting as though there is a nonprofit 
exception when there is no clear statement from either Congress or the 
Supreme Court will only result in money flowing to lawyers rather than 
mission-oriented nonprofit activities.
262
 Whatever the line is, it needs to 
be drawn by Congress.
263
 
This Part has shown that neither applying the same standard to 
nonprofits as for-profits nor broadly exempting nonprofits from that 
standard is ideal. To move forward, a clear rule is needed—preferably 
one that balances both nonprofit and intern concerns. 
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FLSA TO INCLUDE A 
NARROW, TAX LAW-BASED EXCEPTION FOR INTERNS 
AT CERTAIN NONPROFITS 
Most scholars writing about unpaid nonprofit intern have focused on 
making an argument for or against a nonprofit exception under current 
court holdings and DOL guidance.
264
 Only one, Anthony Tucci, made a 
totally new proposal: to establish a nonprofit-specific test, along the 
lines of those articulated in Fact Sheet #71 or Fox Searchlight.
265
 But 
Tucci’s test was still designed to apply to all nonprofits.
266
 No scholar 
has yet explored the idea of a bright-line exception that only applies to 
some nonprofits. This Part will explain why a narrowly tailored 
exception makes sense from both a legal and policy standpoint and will 
propose three possible narrow exceptions based on type, activities, or 
size of organization. 
                                                     
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 1154–55. 
264. See id.; Harthill, supra note 15; Pianko, supra note 20. 
265. See generally Tucci, supra note 20. 
266. Id. 
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A. A Narrowly-Tailored Exception Is Preferable to a Broad One 
As shown in Part III, the question around a possible nonprofit 
exception has up to this point been, “Does it exist or not?” It demands a 
blanket yes or no: Either a rule applies to all nonprofits, or it applies to 
none. But this question is inherently problematic under existing case law 
and legislative history, and it neglects to take notice of the extreme 
diversity present in the nonprofit sector. A narrow, non-blanket 
exception, however, would conform with current law and balance many 
of the conflicting policy goals articulated in Part III. 
1. Alamo Foundation and Legislative History Support an Exception, 
but Not a Blanket One 
The text of the FLSA, its legislative history, and Supreme Court 
precedent all suggest an exception for nonprofits. But all three indicate a 
strong push against a blanket exception. 
As discussed earlier, the text of FLSA does contain the basis for some 
form of a nonprofit exception.
267
 But despite the push from scholars, the 
DOL, and even the Supreme Court to create a more expansive exception, 
what remains in the text is very limited: private, nonprofit food banks.
268
 
This exception remained narrow despite congressional discussion that it 
was not intended to be exclusive.
269
 If anything, this shows that future 
legislative action on the FLSA may come in the form of narrow 
exceptions, rather than broad ones. 
Similarly, in Alamo Foundation, the Supreme Court rejected a blanket 
exemption on the basis of legislative history.
270
 The Court cited the 
Senate Committee report and Congressional Record from the bill that 
expanded the FLSA to include enterprise coverage.
271
 These documents 
indicate that “the activities of nonprofit groups were excluded from 
coverage only insofar as they were not performed for a ‘business 
purpose,’” and that a proposed floor amendment was debated that would 
have expressly excluded 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations from the 
“employer” definition.
272
 The amendment was rejected on the grounds 
                                                     
267. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5) (2012). 
268. 144 CONG. REC. H5386 (daily ed. June 25, 1998) (statements of Reps. Ballenger and 
Owens). 
269. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1985). 
270. Id. 
271. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 297 (referencing 106 CONG. REC. 16704 (1960) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy)). 
272. Id. at 297 (quoting 106 CONG. REC. 16704 (1960) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). 
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that it would broaden the exception too far and would allow a 
“‘profitmaking corporation or company’ owned by ‘an eleemosynary 
institution’” to be exempt from FLSA requirements.
273
 While this may 
not be perfect evidence of Congress’ intent, the Court relied on this 
information to conclude that Congress did not mean to broadly exclude 
nonprofits from enterprise coverage under the FLSA.
274
 While this 
Comment is not particularly concerned with enterprise coverage, the 
Alamo Foundation decision indicates a Supreme Court preference 
toward a non-blanket exemption. 
Thomas Johnson’s Note makes many great points about the current 
status of the nonprofit exception, but in his comments on Alamo 
Foundation, he overlooks an important distinction. Whereas Johnson 
states the Supreme Court’s guidance in the case is to “treat for-profits 
and nonprofits identically,”
275
 the Court actually only stated that 
nonprofits and for-profits should be treated identically so far as their 
activities mirror each other—namely, when those activities are 
commercial in nature.
276
 As will be discussed further in sections IV.B 
and IV.C.1, this position with regard to commercial activities tracks an 
important distinction the Internal Revenue Service makes in its treatment 
of tax-exempt organizations, and one that may be used as a guidepost for 
other possible narrow exceptions. 
2. A Narrow Exception Accounts for the Diversity of Tax-Exempt 
Organizations and Balances Competing Policy Aims 
A narrow exception not only has legal support; put simply, it makes 
sense. Unlike a broad exception, a narrow exception takes notice of the 
diverse nature of tax-exempt organizations and allows for some, but not 
all, to have unpaid interns. By crafting such an exception, Congress 
could create a “scalpel” rather than a “cleaver,” effectively balancing 
pro-intern and pro-nonprofit policy goals. 
People frequently underestimate the diversity of the nonprofit sector 
or misunderstand the scope and definition of the term.
277
 An 
                                                     
273. Id. at 298 (quoting 106 CONG. REC. 16704 (1960) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). 
274. Id. at 299. 
275. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1143. 
276. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 297–99. 
277. See Myths About Nonprofits, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, https://www.councilof 
nonprofits.org/myths-about-nonprofits [https://perma.cc/6JDA-SDY6]. Compare Allison Gauss, Is 
It Time to Ditch the Word “Nonprofit”?, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (June 13, 2016), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/is_it_time_to_ditch_the_word_nonprofit [https:// perma.cc/7QES-
68GA], with Jim Schaffer, Can We Stop Arguing over “Nonprofit”?, NONPROFIT Q. (June 20, 
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organization can be a “nonprofit” at the state level without being tax-
exempt federally.
278
 Among those organizations granted federal tax 
exemption, there is still a great deal of diversity. Section 501 of the U.S. 
Code provides tax exemptions for no less than twenty-eight different 














 The diversity among, and even within, these 
types of organizations has led some scholars to question the merits of 
granting them tax exemption.
285
 
The most well-known entities from these categories are 501(c)(3) 
organizations, which are operated for a limited set of purposes such as 
charitable, religious, educational, literary, and other objectives.
286
 These 
are generally referred to as “charitable nonprofits” and are essentially the 
only tax-exempt organizations to which donations are eligible for a tax 
deduction.
287
 Although scholars and politicians do not always say so 
explicitly, most discussions around a potential exception to the FLSA 
focus only on an exception for charitable nonprofits.
288
 
                                                     
2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/06/20/can-we-stop-arguing-over-nonprofit/ 
[https://perma.cc/ESJ9-5SDQ] (debating the suitability of the term “nonprofit” to describe the 
sector). 
278. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 57 (1981); What Is the Difference Between Nonprofit, Tax 
Exempt, and Charitable?, IRS STAY EXEMPT (last updated Feb. 21, 2015), https://www.stay 
exempt.irs.gov/Resource-Library/What-is-the-difference-between-nonprofit-tax-exempt-and-
charitable [https://perma.cc/ZV7X-U824]; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 24.03.015 (2016) 
(providing for the incorporation of nonprofit corporations at the state level in Washington State). 
279. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012). 
280. Id. § 501(c)(6). 
281. Id. § 501(c)(8). 
282. Id. § 501(c)(14). 
283. Id. § 501(c)(13). 
284. See id. § 501(c)(1)–(29). 
285. See, e.g., Perry Fleischer, supra note 237, at 256 (considering the charitable merits of the 
opera, in comparison to the soup kitchen). 
286. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
287. Id. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2). Gifts to other entities are deductible on the following limited bases: 
(1) a state or the United States, or any subdivision thereof if the gift is for exclusively public 
purposes; (2) a veterans’ organization, so long as no part of its net earnings “inures to the benefit of 
any private shareholder”; (3) a fraternal organization, if the gift is used exclusively for the charitable 
purposes outlined in § 501(c)(3); or (4) a cemetery company, which is not operated for profit and is 
owned and operated solely for its members’ benefit. Id. § 170(c)(1), (3)–(5). 
288. See, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. 16703 (1960) (statements of Sen. Goldwater and Sen. Kennedy) 
(debating the merits of Sen. Goldwater’s proposed amendment that would “specifically exclude 
from the term ‘enterprise’ any employer exempt from taxation under section 501(c) (3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code”); Harthill, supra note 15, at 605; Johnson, supra note 18, at 1129–32; Lisa 
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But even 501(c)(3) organizations are divided further by the 
International Revenue Service (IRS). Some organizations are designated 
“private foundations” while others are “public charities,” a distinction 
that turns on how the organization operates and from where it receives 
its support.
289
 There are member organizations and nonmember 
organizations.
290
 Then there is possibly the most important differentiator 
of all: size, in terms of both impact and budget. Where some nonprofits 
are operating with budgets in the tens and hundreds of millions of 
dollars, more than half have annual revenues of less than $100,000.
291
 
This diversity is actually helpful because it enables line-drawing in a 
way that can balance policy interests far better than a broad exception. A 
broad exception forces us to ask, “Should we resolve this at the expense 
of the intern or the organization?” No one wants to see interns taken 
advantage of, but they also do not want to inhibit the positive 
contributions nonprofits make to society. A narrow exception can 
instead cut along already existing lines to provide more leeway to 
nonprofits that actually need it, while taking care of interns as much as 
possible. As explored further in sections IV.B and IV.C, these bright 
lines already exist in a statute familiar to nonprofits: the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
B. Tax Law Provides a Simple, Clear, and Supported Basis for a 
Narrow Exception 
The Internal Revenue Code offers a clear, easy route to implementing 
a narrow nonprofit exception with bright-line rules that support policy 
goals. This route makes even more sense given the structure of the 
FLSA, Supreme Court precedent, and the Code’s existing relationship to 
nonprofits. 
Admittedly, clarity is not usually what people think of when they 
think about tax law. The Tax Code on the whole is extremely complex 
                                                     
M. Milani, The Applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Volunteer Workers at Nonprofit 
Organizations, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223, 237–38 (1986); Tucci, supra note 20, at 1385 
(“Under the proposed limited-service-exemption prong, work typically associated with public-
service volunteerism is intentionally broad. It allows a bona fide unpaid intern to volunteer his or 
her ‘services needed to carry out [the nonprofit’s] charitable, educational, or religious programs.’”). 
289. I.R.C. § 509(a) (providing all 501(c)(3) organizations are classified as private foundations 
unless they fall into one of four exceptions); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.509(a)-2–(a)-4 (2016) (explaining the 
four exceptions). 
290. See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3 (2016) (allowing membership fees to be included in the 
“support test” establishing a 501(c)(3) as a public charity). 
291. Infra tbl.2. 
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with layers upon layers of rules and exceptions.
292
 But several of the 
parts that apply to nonprofits are very straightforward. These include the 
split between private foundations and public charities,
293
 annual filing 
requirements,
294
 and paying tax on income from commercial activities.
295
 
They are bright-line rules that have stood the test of time. And as the 
following section will explore, these rules balance key policy concerns 
explored in Part III. 
In addition to its clarity on the subject, the Tax Code makes sense to 
use in conjunction with the FLSA because the FLSA is already a “tax-
aware” statute. As discussed earlier, the FLSA only applies to 
“employees,” not independent contractors or other quasi-classes of 
workers.
296
 This distinction tracks the divisions that the IRS makes for 
employers regarding which individuals are subject to payroll tax and 
withholding requirements.
297
 Contrast this with other major employment 
statutes like the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA), which can 
apply to a much broader class of individuals.
298
 While this “awareness” 
is not overt or obvious by any means, it is worth consideration. 
The Supreme Court has also previously lent its support (albeit perhaps 
unintentionally) to distinctions that track the Tax Code. In Alamo 
Foundation, the Court made two notable statements: (1) that in-kind 
benefits were “wages in another form,”
299
 and (2) that the FLSA would 
apply only to the “ordinary commercial activities” of the Foundation, 
rather than its charitable ones.
300
 Under the Tax Code, in-kind benefits 
such as housing are included in an individual’s taxable income and 
effectively treated as “wages in another form” for the purposes of 
                                                     
292. Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Simplification, 2 GEO. 
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 320 (1994); J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, 
and Managing Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 193 (2015). 
293. I.R.C. § 509(a). 
294. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2. 
295. I.R.C. § 511. 
296. See Fair Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012); discussion infra Part I. 
297. Publication 15, (Circular E), Employer’s Tax Guide, DEPT. OF THE TREAS., INTERNAL REV. 
SERV. 9 (2017). 
298. On its face, OSHA also applies to “employees,” and has a similarly ambiguous definition of 
the term to the FLSA. Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2012) (defining 
“employee” as “an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which 
affects commerce”). However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the term in such a way that it can 
include a broader range of individuals. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
752 (1989). 
299. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985). 
300. Id. at 302–03. 
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income tax, subject to some exceptions.
301
 And as will be discussed 
further in section IV.C.1, the split between commercial and charitable 
activities already exists in the Tax Code for determining when tax-
exempt organizations must pay unrelated business income tax, and when 
organizations may qualify as tax-exempt, period.
302
 
Lastly, while the Tax Code governs nearly every individual and 
organization in the United States, it has special relevance to nonprofits. 
Nonprofit organizations can be nonprofit without being tax-exempt,
303
 
but to many the crux of nonprofit status (or, at least, charitable nonprofit 
status) is the ability to receive tax-deductible donations and avoid paying 
taxes.
304
 Because of this, the Code is arguably the most important statute 
governing nonprofits and the one nonprofit managers are the most 
familiar with. If there is a source that already contains bright-line 
distinctions to define a narrow exception, it is the Tax Code. 
C. Three Proposals for a Tax-Based Exception 
The Alamo Foundation Court may have unintentionally laid out the 
bare bones of a framework for narrowing a nonprofit exception by 
tracking the IRS distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
activities. While many of the laws and regulations surrounding tax-
exempt organizations are extremely complex, the three possibilities 
below offer comparatively simple ways to narrow an exception and are 
based in (for the most part) well-settled law. While none of these 
exceptions are perfect, nor will any one of them address every policy 
concern, any of them would offer gains over a blanket exception and 
would be an easy solution for both Congress and nonprofits to adopt. 
1. An Exception for Interns Who Support Exempt Purpose Activities, 
but Not Commercial Ones 
The first possible exception would allow nonprofits to have unpaid 
interns if the interns’ work supports exempt purpose activities, but not if 
                                                     
301. I.R.C. § 61(a). 
302. I.R.C. § 511. 
303. E.g., WASH. ATT’YS ASSISTING CMTY. ORGS./KING CTY BAR ASS’N YOUNG LAWS. DIV., 
WASHINGTON NONPROFIT HANDBOOK: HOW TO FORM AND MAINTAIN A NONPROFIT 
CORPORATION IN WASHINGTON STATE 8 (2009 ed.) (“Organizations can be incorporated under 
Chapter 24.06 RCW, the Nonprofit Miscellaneous and Mutual Corporation Act, for any lawful 
purpose, including, but not limited to, mutual, social, cooperative, fraternal, beneficial, service, 
labor organization and other purposes.”). 
304. Id. at 51–52. 
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they support commercial activities. This exception has strong legal 
support but faces several practical and logistical challenges. 
The exempt purpose/commercial split is one way in which tax law 
treats certain 501(c)(3) organizations differently. The split derives from 
the language of section 501(c)(3), which states that such organizations 
must be “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes.”
305
 
Despite the “exclusive” language, later code provisions allow for limited 
commercial activities, which some organizations use to raise funds for 
their exempt purpose.
306
 Organizations that engage in such activities, as 
in Alamo Foundation, must pay income tax on those revenues if the 
business is regularly carried on and is not substantially related to the 
organization’s purpose.
307
 If this “unrelated business income” constitutes 
a large percentage of an organization’s overall revenues, the 
organization can lose its tax exemption.
308
 
Supreme Court precedent supports an exception based on the exempt 
purpose/commercial split. The Alamo Foundation Court already 
determined that the “associates” in the foundation’s rehabilitation 
program were employees because their work was done in the 
Foundation’s commercial businesses.
309
 It is a short and easy 
extrapolation to extend the same principle to nonprofit interns. 
The Portland Terminal holding further supports this exception.
310
 The 
Court concluded that “employee” does not encompass individuals who, 
“‘solely for’ their own ‘pleasure,’ labor in the service of a cause that 
they believe in.”
311
 Whereas an intern working in furtherance of an 
                                                     
305. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
306. Id. § 511; JAMES J. FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ, & LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER, TAXATION OF 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 311 (4th ed. 2015). 
307.  I.R.C. §§ 511(a), 512(a), 513(a); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 604 (4th ed. 2010).  
308. I.R.C. §§ 511(a), 512(a), 513(a). Unfortunately for nonprofits, there is no set number as to 
what percentage will cause an organization to forfeit tax-exempt status. INTERNAL REV. SERV., 
HOW TO LOSE YOUR 501(C)(3) TAX-EXEMPT STATUS (WITHOUT REALLY TRYING), 
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/charities/charitable/How%20to%20Lose%20Your%20Tax%20Exempt%2
0Status.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3SG-QRQR] (“Earning too much income generated from unrelated 
activities can jeopardize an organization’s 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.” (emphasis added)); 
Unrelated Business Income Taxes (UBIT) in a Nutshell, AM. INST. OF CPAS, https://www.aicpa. 
org/InterestAreas/NotForProfit/Resources/TaxCompliance/Pages/UBITinaNutshell.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/TE6K-PCN6] (“[Nonprofits] can lose their tax-exempt status if the IRS determines 
that the percentage of their income that is from business activities unrelated to their specific exempt 
purposes is excessive.” (emphasis added)). 
309. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985). 
310. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). 
311. Pianko, supra note 20, at 36 (quoting Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152). 
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exempt purpose easily fits “labor[ing] in the service of a cause they 
believe in,”
312
 an intern working in a commercial purpose—one that 
would be subject to unrelated business income tax—is much harder to fit 
into the Portland Terminal holding. 
That said, both nonprofit managers and the DOL would likely 
struggle logistically to apply and enforce such an exception. Nonprofit 
interns may—and probably would—work across both commercial and 
exempt purpose activities.
313
 This puts nonprofits in the difficult position 
of either limiting interns to working on certain tasks or only paying 
interns for the work they do in commercial activities. Furthermore, the 
line between exempt purpose activities and commercial activities is not 




2. An Exception for Interns Who Work at Public Charities, But Not 
for Those Who Work for Private Foundations 
Under the second possible exception, 501(c)(3) organizations that are 
public charities would be allowed to have unpaid interns, while those 
that are private foundations would not. A preference for public charities 
already exists in the tax code,
315
 and allows for easy line drawing. It also 
aligns, for the most part, with the policy goal of differentiating between 
organizations that can afford to pay interns and those that cannot. 
The split between public charities and private foundations is an 
important division among 501(c)(3) organizations. Private foundations 
generally have a higher concentration of wealth and historically have 
                                                     
312. Id. 
313. See Hannah S. Ostroff, How to Manage Interns to Drive Your Nonprofit’s Mission this 
Summer, CAPTERRA: NONPROFIT TECH. BLOG (June 25, 2015), http://blog.capterra.com/how-to-
manage-interns-nonprofits-mission-this-summer/ [https://perma.cc/G9SH-VSTA] (suggesting that 
“an intern could make a great event planning assistant for the fundraising gala coming up in a few 
months, or writing posts for your organization’s blog”). 
314. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 307, at 605 (“The ‘substantially related’ test is more 
difficult to apply. The regulations offer little more than abstract generalizations . . . .”). Take, for 
example, Revenue Ruling 73-105, which involved gift shop sales at a tax-exempt art museum. The 
gift shop sold art-related items including reproductions of artistic works and art literature, as well as 
non-art-related items like scientific books and local souvenirs. The IRS deemed that income from 
the sale of art-related items was related to the museum’s organizational purpose, whereas income 
from the sale of non-art-related items was not. The income from non-related items thus had to be 
separated out and taxed accordingly under the unrelated business income provisions. Rev. Rul. 73-
105, 1973-1 C.B. 264.  
315. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 507(c)–(d) (imposing certain taxes on private foundations which are not 
imposed on public charities); FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 306, at 450–52 (explaining the private 
foundation excise tax regime in detail). 
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been seen as more susceptible to abuse or use for tax evasion,
316
 so they 
are subject to greater regulation by the IRS.
317
 On the other hand, public 
charities have fewer regulatory requirements but are harder to form. A 
new 501(c)(3) organization is presumed to be a private foundation unless 
it presents evidence to the contrary.
318
 To be classified as a public 
charity, an organization must demonstrate that it is either one of a select 
subset of organizations,
319
 or that it receives a certain portion of its total 
support from public sources.
320
 An exception favoring public charities 
tracks the legislative preference behind these provisions of the Code. 
The line between private foundations and public charities is very 
clear, unlike the one between organizational purpose and commercial 
activities. The IRS generally classifies organizations as one or the other 
immediately upon conferring tax-exempt status.
321
 Although a public 
charity can lose its status and be reclassified as a private foundation, this 
occurs only with significant lead time.
322
 An exception narrowed along 
this line would therefore be easy to implement. 
Private foundations are also generally in a better position to pay 
interns without suffering some of the consequences raised supra in 
section III.C.1. These organizations tend to have a higher amount of 
financial capital than public charities and are therefore unlikely to be 
                                                     
316. Tax Abuse of Charitable Organizations: Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 
108th Cong. 4–5 (2004) (Statement of Jay D. Adkisson) (June 22, 2004), http://www.finance. 
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062204jatest.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPG4-BEBU]; FISHMAN & 
SCHWARZ, supra note 307, at 712. 
317. Private Foundations, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-
organizations/private-foundations [https://perma.cc/3XNQ-UWTG] (noting five extra restrictions on 
private foundations). 
318. Id. (“Even if an organization falls within one of the categories excluded from the definition 
of private foundation, it will be presumed to be a private foundation, . . . unless it gives timely 
notice to the IRS that it is not [one].”). 
319. I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A) (churches, schools, hospitals, medical research 
organizations, agricultural research organizations, and governmental units). 
320. Id. § 509(a)(2) (providing that one-third of its annual support must come from public 
sources, and no more than one-third of its annual support may come from the sum of investment 
income and unrelated business income). 
321. See Private Foundations, supra note 317 (“Generally, organizations use Form 1023, 
Application for Recognition of Exemption, for this purpose.”). 
322. Advance Ruling Process Elimination - Public Support Test, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/ 
charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/advance-ruling-process-elimination-public-support-
test [https://perma.cc/FL7W-VSQZ] (stating that an organization’s public charity status is 
reassessed on an annual basis starting five years after its tax exemption is obtained, and that an 
organization that meets the public support test in a given year is classified as a public charity for the 
two years following). 
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forced out of the market.
323
 There would still be a large number of 
internships available, as low-budget public charities would not be 
prevented from offering them due to cost. 
An exception for public charities would not, however, account for a 
policy concern raised in the Johnson Note. Many large public charities 
are sophisticated corporate entities that are almost indistinguishable from 
their for-profit counterparts.
324
 Allowing these nonprofits a privileged 
status with regard to interns would further contribute to the inefficiency 
outlined in section III.B.2. The size-based exception articulated below, 
however, will better address this specific concern. 
3. An Exception for Interns Who Work at Small Nonprofits, as 
Determined by the Organization’s Annual Tax Filing 
With the final potential exception, small nonprofits would not have to 
pay interns, while large nonprofits would be required to do so. But how 
big is too big? Fortunately, the IRS already breaks down 501(c)(3) 
organizations by size in a way an exception could easily track. This 
exception would provide the same advantages of the public 
charity/private foundation distinction above, but with additional benefits. 
The IRS distinguishes between organizations by size for the purposes 
of annual filing requirements.
325
 Despite their tax-exempt status, most 
501(c)(3) organizations are required to file an annual return (Form 990) 
in some format.
326
 The breakdown of what organizations file which 
form, determined by gross receipts and assets, is as follows: 
                                                     
323. Per 2013 statistics, the average assets of a public charity were just over $3 million, while the 
average assets of a private foundation were more than double that, at $6.5 million. Compare 
Number of Public Charities in the United States, 2013, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATS., http:// 
nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=PC [https://perma.cc/466B-
VAFW] (dividing total assets by total number of public charities to get $3,064,751.86), with 
Number of Private Foundations in the United States, 2013, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATS., 
http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=PF 
[https://perma.cc/TP8Q-WBCK] (dividing total assets by total number of private foundations to get 
$6,421,856.65). But see King McGlaughon, Think You Know Private Foundations? Think Again., 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/think_you_know 
_private_foundations_think_again [https://perma.cc/XMG6-SC7T] (noting that for private 
foundations, the average is a misrepresentation as two-thirds have endowments of less than $1 
million). 
324. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1158. 
325. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(i); see also Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations File?, 
IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-series-which-forms-do-exempt-
organizations-file-filing-phase-in [https://perma.cc/2VYA-3QBD] [hereinafter IRS Filing 
Requirements]. 
326. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(1). A few categories of 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from 
filing requirements, including religious organizations, subsidiaries of other nonprofits which are 
 
17 - Pryjmak.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/8/2017  11:07 AM 
2017] A TAX-BASED EXCEPTION FOR NONPROFIT INTERNS 1115 
 
Table 1: 




Status Form to File 
501(c) organization with gross 
receipts normally ≤ $50,000 
990-N 
501(c) organization with gross 
receipts < $200,000 and total assets 
< $500,000 
990-EZ 
501(c) organization with gross 
receipts ≥ $200,000, or total assets 
≥ $500,000 
990 




Like the public charity/private foundation line, it would be relatively 
easy for the IRS to offer an exception to certain nonprofits by size. As 
shown in Table 1, 501(c) organizations are required to file one of four 
tax forms on an annual basis dependent on their gross receipts and 
assets.
328
 While the exact numbers attached to each form may be 
adjusted over time,
329
 tying an exception to the specific form an 
organization must file would likely provide long-term consistency. An 
exception that allows unpaid interns at 501(c)(3) organizations eligible 
to file the 990-N or 990-EZ, but not at those who must file the regular 
990 or 990-PF, would effectively encompass the exception proposed in 
section IV.C.2 while further narrowing it for public charities above a 
certain size. Therefore, a filing-based exception would address the same 
policy concerns articulated above along with excluding the 
“sophisticated corporate entities” Johnson mentions.
330
 
The potential tradeoff of this exception is swinging too far in the 
opposite direction—excluding too many “middle class” public charities 
                                                     
covered under a group return, government corporations, and state institutions that provide essential 
services. Id. § 1.6033(2)(g). 
327. IRS Filing Requirements, supra note 325. 
328. Id. 
329. See Exempt Organizations Annual Reporting Requirements – Overview (Who Must File and 
Return Required), IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/faqs_annualreporting_overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4U5V-7BLZ] (indicating that the 990 filing threshold would be raised from 
$25,000 to $50,000 in 2010, and that organizations which previously had no filing requirement 
would be required to file the 990-N starting in 2008).  
330. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1158. 
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who may be just above the threshold for filing a regular 990, but don’t 
have a large enough budget to reasonably support paid interns. More 
than 932,000 organizations (including all 501(c)s) were projected to file 
a return other than the 990-PF in 2015, and roughly 49% of them were 
projected to file the regular 990, compared to 18% for the 990-EZ and 
33% for the 990-N.
331
 
However, looking at statistics as of August 2016, roughly 440,000 
reporting public charities showed the following breakdown in terms of 
revenue and assets: 
 
Table 2: 




Total Revenue % Reporting 
Charities 
Total Assets % Reporting 
Charities 
< $100,000 48 < $100,000 51 
$100,000–249,000 17 $100,000–249,000 12 
$250,000–499,999 10 $250,000–499,999 9 
$500,000–999,999 7 $500,000–999,999 7 
$1–5 mil. 10 $1–5 mil. 12 
$5–10 mil. 2 $5–10 mil. 3 
$10–100 mil. 3 $10–100 mil. 4 
> $100 mil. 1 > $100 mil. 1 
 
While this data set does not directly track the 990 filing increments, it 
shows that a relatively small percentage of public charities fall into the 
“middle class” area where they must file the regular 990 but have sub-
million dollar assets and revenues. Only a combined 17% have revenues 
between $250,000 and $1 million, while only 7% have assets in the 
range of $500,000 to $1 million.
333
 This indicates that although there is a 
downside to a filing-based exception, its overall effects may be minimal 
compared with the other proposals. 
                                                     
331. See Brett Collins, Projections of Federal Tax Return Filings: Calendar Years 2009–2016, 
IRS.GOV: STATS. OF INCOME BULL., fig.A (Winter 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/10winbulreturnfilings.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4SH-W8SZ].  
332. Registered Nonprofit Organizations by Level of Total Assets (BMF 08/2016), NAT’L CTR. 
FOR CHARITABLE STATS., http://nccsweb.urban.org/tablewiz/showreport.php [https://perma.cc/J8JL-
UF2D]. 
333. Id. 
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Ultimately, Congress will have to decide who to favor and who to 
burden with any decision related to FLSA exceptions. An activities-
based exception would create logistical headaches for nonprofit 
managers, while a filing-based exception would leave a “donut hole” for 
middle-class organizations. An exception for public charities would add 
to an already-existing regulatory burden on private foundations. But any 
of the proposals described above would provide a better balance of 
burdens than what currently exists under the broad exception framework. 
CONCLUSION 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight is only one in a long line of cases debating 
who must be paid a minimum wage under the FLSA.
334
 The most 
significant thing that has emerged from that debate is confusion over 
whether interns and similar individuals are “employees” as defined by 
the statute. This lack of clarity is even more challenging for nonprofits 




A broad exception would make things easier for nonprofits but at this 
time lacks a strong foundation in law.
336
 Without such a foundation, an 
“illusory exemption” only creates more uncertainty for nonprofits while 
making life harder for interns.
337
 A broad exception is also in conflict not 




Instead, a narrow exception is the answer. A narrow nonprofit 
exception would track legislative intent, fit within existing Supreme 
Court precedent, and address many of the policy concerns inherent 
within the issue.
339
 Tax law offers an easy route to such an exception.
340
 
Any of the three possible exceptions outlined in this Comment would 
also have the merits of being both easy to implement and already 
familiar to the nonprofit sector. Congress should move to amend the 
FLSA and adopt a narrow exception on one or more of these grounds. 
                                                     
334. See supra Parts I & II. 
335. See supra section III.A. 
336. See supra section III.B. 
337. Harthill, supra note 15, at 601. See also supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra section IV.A. 
339. See supra section IV.A. 
340. See supra section IV.B. 
